Certificate authority (CA)
A certificate authority (CA) signs digital certificates. Each signature says that a public key belongs to a name, such as api.example.com. Public CAs such as Let's Encrypt, DigiCert and Sectigo issue certificates for websites. A private CA, run with HashiCorp Vault, cert-manager or AWS Private CA, issues them for internal services that only your own machines need to trust.
How it works
A root CA signs its own certificate. Clients get that self-signed root ahead of time, in a trust store. That can be the macOS Keychain, a browser's root store, a file such as /etc/ssl/cert.pem, or a bundle a runtime carries with it, like Python's certifi or the JDK's cacerts. Root keys are kept offline, so day-to-day signing happens at an intermediate CA that the root has signed.
During a TLS handshake the server sends its own certificate plus the intermediates. The client checks every signature and date on the way up and accepts the connection if the top of the chain is a root in its store.
Before a public CA signs for a domain, it checks that the requester controls it, usually through ACME, the protocol Let's Encrypt uses. The CA asks for a token at a URL under /.well-known/acme-challenge/ or in a DNS TXT record. Browsers also expect each certificate to appear in public Certificate Transparency (CT) logs, where a domain owner can spot certificates nobody on the team asked for.
To take a certificate back before it expires, the CA revokes it and publishes that in a certificate revocation list (CRL), and browser vendors push their own block lists, such as Chrome's CRLSet.
The eMudhra incident shows where this breaks. In April 2025 eMudhra issued eight intermediate CA certificates whose private keys could be derived from the public certificates in under a second, so anyone could sign a certificate for any domain. A researcher reported it on 17 October 2026 and Chrome shipped a CRLSet block within two hours.
curl, git, Python, Node.js, Go and Java checked neither revocation nor CT logs. They saw a chain ending at a root in their bundle and connected.
One2N's probe scripts test six TLS stacks against 12 checker hosts, 6 per affected root, which gives 72 results on one Mac. Each stack only passes once its own store has lost the two roots.
Why it matters in production
Every root in a trust store can vouch for every domain, so one careless CA anywhere in the store exposes all of your HTTPS clients. Expiry causes more outages than compromise, though. A forgotten server certificate or an internal root reaching its end date breaks every connection that chains to it at the same moment.
Find out which store each service actually reads (a container uses the bundle in its base image), automate renewal, and alert when a certificate has 30 days left. For service-to-service mutual TLS, a private CA hands out short-lived certificates to workloads, which is what Istio does for every pod in the mesh.
See also
On the One2N blog
References
